1971 Declassified
Games without frontiers



Zayd Almer Khan
Courtesy: New Age BD, December 5-11
 


For the January 2003 issue of SLATE, the monthly magazine from Holiday, Zayd Almer Khan had sifted through hundreds of pages of disembargoed US Intelligence documents on Bangladesh’s Liberation War. Xtra reprints the selected chronological commentary on the official transcripts of conversations between heads of state, secret despatches from the diplomatic corps and the CIA, and of a global war-game played over the birth of a nation.

March 28, 1971: ‘Selective Genocide’
   
   In the very first report on the crackdown on the streets of Dhaka, Archer K. Blood, the American consul general in Dhaka, sends out an urgent telegram, subject: ‘Selective Genocide’, to the secretary of state in Washington DC and to relevant US embassies and consulates including at Islamabad and New Delhi.
   
   Blood writes, “Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror of the Pak military…among those marked for extinction in addition to AL [Awami League] hierarchy, are student leaders and university faculty…in this second category we have reports that Fazlur Rahman, head of applied physics department, Prof. Dev, Head of philosophy department and a Hindu, M. Abedin, head of department of history, have been killed. Razzak of political science is rumoured dead. Also on list are bulk of MNA’s elect and number of MPA’s.
   
   “…Non-Bengali Muslims are systematically attacking…and murdering Bengalis and Hindus…Many Bengalis have sought refuge in homes of Americans, most of whom are extending shelter…There is NO rpt NO RESISTANCE being offered in Dacca to military.”
   
   Blood goes on to question America’s stance not to condemn the attacks and continue supporting Pakistan, adding, “Full horror of Pak military atrocities will come to light sooner or later. I, therefore, question continued advisability of present USG [US government] posture of pretending to believe GOP [Government of Pakistan] false assertions and denying…that this office is communicating detailed account of events in East Pakistan. We should be expressing our shock, at least privately to GOP, at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pak military.”
   
   March 29, 1971: ‘Principle the best politics’
   
   The first reply to the ‘Selective Genocide’ telegram, curiously, comes from the US ambassador in New Delhi, Ken Keating. He telegrams the secretary of state and his fellow ambassador at Islamabad, expressing deep shock at the “massacre by Pakistani military in East Pakistan”, and appal at “the possibility these atrocities are being committed with American equipment”.
   
   Keating advises that the US, “(a) should promptly, publicly and prominently deplore this brutality, (b) should privately lay it on line with GOP and so advise GOI [government of India], and (c) should announce unilateral abrogation of…military supply agreement…It is most important that these actions be taken now, prior to inevitable and imminent emergence of horrible truths.”
   
   Keating ends, pleadingly, “This is time when principles make best politics.”
   
   March 30/31, 1971: Reports of massacre and resistance
   
   Blood continues to send in reports to Washington, mentioning as many facts and numbers as possible. He says that Dhaka University students were “either shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out of building…estimated 1,000 persons, mostly students, but including faculty members resident in dorms, killed…At least two mass graves on campus, one near Iqbal Hall, other near Rokeya Hall. Rain [on the night of] March 29 exposed some bodies. Stench terrible.”
   
   Blood claims difficulty in estimating the exact number of casualties, but confirms that between 600 to 800 East Pakistani members of the police force were killed in their barracks on the night of the 25th, and a number of “casualties in the old city where the army troops burned Hindu and Bengali areas…Most observers put these casualties in the range of 2,000 to 4,000…It seems clear that the whole objective of the West Pak army apparently was and is to hit hard and terrorize population into submission. All evidence suggests that they have been fairly successful.”
   
   In his next message Blood gives more details of the army campaign. “Wanton acts of violence by military are continuing in Dacca…scattered firing heard throughout night…truckloads of prisoners seen going into EPR camp at Peelkhana…room-by-room check of Hotel Intercontinental conducted…student activists still being picked up…Central Shahid Minar demolished…naked female bodies at Rokeya Hall, Dacca U. Feet tied together. Bits of ropes hanging from ceiling fans. Apparently raped, shot and hung by heels from fans…Numerous reports of unprovoked killings.”
   
   The first reports of resistance also come in from Blood around this time. He quotes British and Japanese reports of the army being “unable to move out of [mufassil] towns”. “Army broadcasts monitored here indicated one unit in desperate situation in Pabna…Low on ammunition. Called for help, including air strikes. Told to hold out ‘at all costs’…Many Bangla Desh flags seen flying in Kushtia…Indo-Pak border area between Dinajpur and Rajshahi open for movements back and forth by ‘resistance forces’.”
   
   April 6, 1971: ‘Support for likely loser foolish step’
   
   Assistant secretary of state Joe Sisco meets with Pakistan’s ambassador Agha Hilaly in Washington DC to ‘express concern’. Hilaly asks that “due allowance be made for behaviour of Pak officials during what had amounted to a ‘civil war for a few days’”. Hilaly also complains of “misrepresentations” in the US press, and Sisco, in turn, says that the US government had been “circumspect in its public comments in light of conflicting reports and in recognition this was an internal matter for Pakistan”.
   
   According to the transcript of their conversation, “Sisco indicated to Hilaly we wish to be helpful. Hilaly expressed appreciation [of] restraint of USG to date and said he ‘could not have expected more of [the] Department’.”
   
   On the same day, twenty staffers of the consulate general, USAID and USIS in Dhaka send in a joint message to the secretary of state, subject: Dissent from US policy toward East Pakistan. The message begins, “…With the conviction that US policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined, numerous officers…consider it their duty to register strong dissent with fundamental aspects of this policy. Our government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government…[is] bending over backwards to placate the West Pak dominated government…Our government has evidenced what many will call moral bankruptcy, ironically at a time when the USSR sent president Yahya a message defending democracy, condemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party and calling for an end to repressive measures and bloodshed.”
   
   Blood, being the principal officer stationed in Dhaka, does not sign the statement, but adds in the same telegram, “I believe the views of these officers, who are among the finest US officials in East Pakistan, are echoed by the vast majority of the American community, both official and unofficial. I also subscribe to these views but I do not think it appropriate for me to sign.”
   
   Most interestingly, however, Blood adds in the last paragraph of the despatch, the following telling statement: “I believe the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in East Pakistan is a Bengali victory and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangla Desh. At the moment we possess the good will of the Awami League. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser.”
   
   April 28, 1971: ‘Don’t squeeze Yahya’
   
   National security assistant Henry Kissinger sends a memo to President Nixon outlining the three policy alternatives available to his government. Kissinger mentions that the resistance to the Pak military is “poorly organised and equipped” and the army will eventually regain control of the main towns. But he warns that Indo-Pak tensions are at their highest point since 1965. Kissinger then gives Nixon the three options: (a) “essentially a posture of supporting whatever political and military program president Yahya chooses to pursue in the East”; (b) “to try to maintain a posture of genuine neutrality”; and (c) “an effort to help Yahya achieve a negotiated settlement”.
   
   Nixon chooses the last option, but adds to the end of the memo, in his own handwriting, “To all hands: DON’T squeeze Yahya at this time.”
   
   May 10, 1971: ‘Yahya a good friend’
   
   President Nixon meets at his Oval Office ambassador Hilaly and M.M. Ahmad, economic advisor to Yahya. Nixon opens the meeting noting that president Yahya is a good friend and he could “understand the anguish of the decisions which he had had to make”. Ahmad conveys Yahya’s appreciation of the stance that the US had taken. Nixon replied, “There were a number of critics who felt that the US should become heavily involved in telling Pakistan how to work out its political difficulties…The US is not going to become involved in that way. It is wrong to assume that the US should go around telling other countries how to arrange their political affairs.”
   
   At the end of the meeting, Hilaly mentions to Nixon that former president Ayub had had a successful open-heart surgery earlier the same day and was doing well. Nixon, walking his guests out, wishes that “some of the marvellous things that were done by modern surgery could be performed on nations as well”.
   
   May 26, 1971: ‘Indo-Pak war likely’
   
   Secretary of State Rogers sends President Nixon a memo, subject: Possible India-Pakistan War. Rogers begins, “The situation in East Pakistan is evolving to the point where we now believe it possible that it could touch off a war between India and Pakistan. In the event of such a conflict, the possibility of Chinese pressure on India along their border, followed by increased Soviet military assistance to India, cannot be excluded.
   
   “Three things have created the danger of war: continued military repression, economic dislocation and lack of political accommodation in East Pakistan; the very heavy flow of refugees to India…; and Indian cross-border support to Bengali guerrillas…We agree that president Yahya is not likely to take steps to bring about political accommodation until he realises, himself, how essential it is. We cannot force him to this realisation and therefore we are not imposing political conditions on our assistance.”
   
   Rogers attaches to the memo a list of actions already taken by the US government vis-à-vis India and Pakistan “to reduce the danger of conflict”. They include, for India: $2.5 million in refugee relief; approval to provide four C-130 aircrafts for airlift of refugees and to supply relief; and directives to avoid direct action. For Pakistan, they include: directive to ask for relief assistance from the UN; US food aid under PL-480; directive to encourage return of refugees, especially Hindu minorities; and emphasised to GOP to show restraint in dealing with India.
   
   June 21, 1971: ‘…the president has a special feeling for President Yahya.’
   
   A perturbed Ken Keating, the US ambassador to India, meets Kissinger in his office and asks to be told “what you know”, saying he was emotionally upset about developments in Pakistan. Kissinger says that it was “premature to move on the Paks”. He adds, “We certainly will use our influence to do whatever we can to help solve the current humanitarian problem. But the president has felt that we should give president Yahya a few months to see what he can work out. As the president sees it, if we approach the Pakistanis emotionally now, we would not gain anything and we might lose what ability we may have to influence the situation.”
   
   Kissinger goes on to say, “Our judgement is that East Pakistan will eventually become independent. The problem is ‘how to bell the cat’. The president has chosen to do it gradually. In all honesty, the president has a special feeling for President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it is a fact of life.”
   
   Keating leaves the meeting disgruntled, insisting that military aid to Pakistan should be “out of the question” as they are still killing East Pakistanis. Kissinger says that the US was only supplying spare parts not relevant to the situation. Keating insists that his review of the brief on the issue convinces him that the “non-lethal military equipment and spares” that was still being supplied could technically include ammunition.
   
   July 7, 1971: ‘US is a friend of India’
   
   At the Ashoka Hotel in New Delhi, Kissinger meets Indian AEC chairman Dr. Sarabhai and Dr. Haksar, special assistant to the Indian Prime Minister. Kissinger reiterates that under any circumstances the US would back India against any Chinese pressure, adding that the US knew that foreign domination of India would be a disaster. “It was for a strong, independent India which would make for stability in the region,” Kissinger said. “From what we knew, this was the Soviet aim as well, and we did not believe that the US and the Soviets had any conflicting interests in India.” Kissinger calls India a “potential world power” while calling Pakistan a “regional power”.
   
   Upon being asked about a $20 million arms shipment to Pakistan, Kissinger blows it off as a “bureaucratic oversight” which would “prove to be an unimportant episode” in India-US relations as such amounts cannot threaten India. “The US hopes to use its influence with Pakistan, rather than cutting off all influence, and move it towards a political evolution in East Pakistan that we believe India wanted also.”
   
   July 28, 1971: ‘Thanks for “China initiative”’
   
   Joseph Farland, the American ambassador to Pakistan, meets President Nixon at the Oval Office. Nixon thanks and congratulates Farland for his role in the “China initiative”. Nixon says that he had been told by Kissinger of the role Farland played as an intermediary and of his “skill in providing cover for Dr. Kissinger’s visit to Peking from Pakistan”. This kind of work, the president adds, took great discretion and professionalism, and the ambassador had made a great contribution.
   
   Farland expresses President Yahya’s appreciation of the US’s position. Nixon asks for his thanks to be conveyed to the Pakistani president, his appreciation for Pakistan’s help in the “China initiative”. “As for Pakistan’s present difficulties,” Nixon adds, “we would not add to his burdens.”
   
   August 7, 1971: Nixon writes to Yahya
   
   Following is verbatim transcription of president Nixon’s handwritten note to president Yahya dated this day:
   
   Dear Mr. President
   
   I have already expressed my official appreciation for your assistance for arranging our contact with the People’s Republic of China. Through this personal note I want you to know that without your personal assistance this profound breakthrough in relations between the USA and the PRC could never have been accomplished. I …would extend my personal thanks to your ambassador in Washington and to your associates in Pakistan for their efficiency and discretion in handling the very sensitive arrangements.
   
   Those who want a more peaceful world in the generations to come will forever be in your debt. Doctor Kissinger joins me in expressing our deepest gratitude for the historic role you played during the very difficult period.
   
   Sincerely
   
   Richard Nixon

   
   August 9, 1971: Indira running out of patience
   
   Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi writes to President Nixon. Mentioning that military oppression in East Pakistan continues unabated and that the registered refugees list has crossed seven million, Gandhi writes, “It is not for us to object to the US maintaining, as you Mr. President have put it, ‘a constructive relationship with Pakistan’ so that the US may ‘retain some influence in working with them towards important decisions to be made in that country’. We have waited patiently and with restraint, hoping for a turn in the tide of events which…India could recognise as a step towards a political settlement…[But president Yahya’s] pronouncements show a hardening of attitude and it seems to us that they do not take us nearer a solution.”
   
   Gandhi also protests continuing US supply of arms to Pakistan, writing, “Our government was greatly embarrassed that soon after our foreign minister’s return from his Washington visit and despite the statements made by ambassador Keating in Bombay on April 16…came the news of fresh supply of arms to Pakistan…These arms are being used against their own people whose only fault appears to be that they took seriously president Yahya Khan’s promise to restore democracy.”
   
   August 16, 1971: Kissinger gangs up with China
   
   Kissinger is in Paris to secretly meet Huang Chen, the Chinese ambassador there. Official talk begin after banter about Kissinger’s secret life. (Huang: You arrived last night? Kissinger: Yes. Huang: You had a good rest? Kissinger: Yes. I have come to France secretly eleven times by five different methods. I am going to write a detective story when I am through. Huang: You have very intelligent methods.)
   
   On the issue of South Asia, the following is agreed. The US would not embarrass Pakistan at any point and would not stand for any Indian initiatives to exploit the refugee situation. Both countries would encourage Pakistan to allow the maximum refugees to return so that India cannot capitalise. That the US would cut off economic aid to India if the latter took military actions. Agreed that India was involved in “subversive acts” in meddling with the internal matters of Pakistan. Peking would encourage Pakistan to be “more imaginative politically and psychologically”. That the US would “understand” if China “furnished” Pakistan with military equipment at this point.
   
   November 12/15, 1971: Seventh fleet coming as East is a ‘lost cause’
   
   A November 15 memo to General Haig, the deputy assistant to the US president on national security, from Admiral Welander confirms that Kissinger has been informed of a naval ‘task force’, including an aircraft carrier, has been put on “48-hour notice” to move into the Indian Ocean to “dissuade third-party involvement” in East Pakistan.
   
   On November 12, the political officers of all US embassies and consulates in India and Pakistan meet in Islamabad and decide that, “Indian/Mukti Bahini pressures on Pak forces in East Pak were building up to a point at which GOP may be goaded into counteractions which could precipitate Indo/Pak war.” They also concluded that there was “little possibility of two wings of Pakistan remaining united”.
   
   Early December, 1971: Playing both sides as a greater war looms
   
   Kissinger and President Nixon speak several times on December 4. With his administration gradually coming to terms with an eventual West Pakistani defeat, Nixon continues his defiance. Kissinger mentions an SOS from Yahya claiming that his military supplies are “in very bad shape”. Nixon instructs Kissinger to ask Jordan to provide fighter aircrafts and ammunition to Pakistan. Kissinger points out that the US cannot ask its supplies to be sent to a third nation. The final decision is to involve as many buffers away from the US origin of arms as possible, with Jordan supplying Pakistan, Iran replenishing Jordan, and Israel agreeing not to “take advantage of Jordan’s weakened defence posture” while its arms supply is diminished due to its supply to Pakistan. “I think if we tell the Iranians we will make it up to them, we can do it, “ Kissinger says of the plan.
   
   News of rapid gains by India/Mukti Bahini perturbs Nixon, and he asks Kissinger to make sure that “the press blame India as the aggressor”. Kissinger says of the Indian gains, “Now that India will occupy all of Pakistan we will see their real motives. If the East Bengalis get _______, if they think Pakistan is brutal, wait till India gets them. India will push the Moslems into a much narrow area than they already have.”
   
   Keating is called back from Delhi after a “strong demarche” is delivered to the Indian prime minister. Nixon arranges for “immediate movement of US naval task force with BLT and maximum SSBN and surface escort to Indian Ocean”. China is notified that “the US government would look with favour on steps taken by that government to demonstrate its determination to intervene by force if necessary to preserve the territorial integrity of West Pakistan, including subtle assurances the government of the United States will not stand by should the Soviet Union launch attacks against the PRC”. A CIA appraisal of Chinese military capabilities dated December 9, on the other hand, assures Nixon that, “In any event, Chinese action against India would probably be small scale in order to avoid provoking Soviet retaliatory moves.”
   
   December 12/14, 1971: Nuclear fleet advancing
   
   At a December 12 meeting between Ambassador Huang Hua of China and General Haig, China insists that “one must not show the slightest sign of weakness toward the Soviet Union and India” in implementing a ceasefire and troops withdrawal from East and West Pakistan, and that “no recognition must be given to Bangla Desh”. China assures the US that they are “stepping up support and assistance to Pakistan”, The US, in return, assure that the “movement of the forces of the Seventh Fleet is underway, and will go through the Straights of Malacca the next day”, and also that they have arranged for Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to supply further arms to Pakistan.
   
   On December 14, the Indian ambassador to the US expresses concern over the “deployment of nuclear carrier in the Indian Ocean”. The US claimed ‘officially’ that the deployment was for evacuation purposes, but the Indian ambassador reiterates India’s position that any evacuation efforts would not be tolerated if they came “without prior approval of India or by force”.
   
   December 16, 1971: Game over
   
   A CIA intelligence memorandum confirms that the West Pakistani military forces in East Pakistan have surrendered. New civil administration is expected to take over the next day. The CIA report says, “the Indian government insists Bangla Desh have a nationally based government rather than the present provincial government, dominated by the Awami League. The Awami League has been resisting, but Prime Minister Gandhi has reportedly come to an agreement with the nine-man consultative committee which includes two pro-Moscow communists and was formed several months ago.”
   
   The report fears that the Indian army will not retreat from East Bengal until it is assured that the Mukti Bahini does not constitute a threat to the new regime. “To this end, the army has been instructed to isolate extreme radical elements within the irregular forces,” the CIA claims. “It is likely that only the former police units will be allowed to continue their security roles; the frontier guards and the Bengali Rifles will be disbanded.”
   
   The US continues to provide “third party” military support and supplies to West Pakistan.
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Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Hindu Genocide East Pakistan
Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Hindu Genocide East Pakistan
Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Hindu Genocide East Pakistan
Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Hindu Genocide East Pakistan
Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Hindu Genocide East Pakistan
Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Bangladesh 1971 Genocide Liberation Hindu Genocide East Pakistan