Hamoodur Rahman Commission
Report
Chapter 5:
Recommendations
In the concluding portion of our Main Report, submitted in 1972, we had
made a number of recommendations based on our study of the various aspects
of the causes of the debacle of 1971. Some of these recommendations need
to be modified, or amplified, in the light of the fresh evidence which we
have now recorded; while the need for the others has only been further
emphasised. We believe that the object of setting up this Commission
would be fully realised only of appropriate and early action is taken by
the Government on these recommendation.
2. Even though it involves a repetition of
what we have already said in the Main Report, we consider that it would be
appropriate if all our recommendations are now finally set out at one
place, for facility of reference and action. Detailed reasons and
justification for these recommendations will be found in the relevant
Chapters of the Main Report as well as this Supplementary Report. We are
aware that some of these recommendations have already been implemented,
but this would not appear to be a reason for not including them in this
final summing up.
Trials
3. There is consensus on the imperative need
of bringing to book those senior Army Commanders who have brought disgrace
and defeat to Pakistan by their subversion of the Constitution, usurpation
of political power by criminal conspiracy, their professional
incompetence, culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of
their duties and physical and moral cowardice in abandoning the fight when
they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy. Firm and
proper action would not only satisfy the nation's demand for punishment
where it is deserved, but would also ensure against any future recurrence
of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the 1971 war. We
accordingly recommend that the following trials be undertaken without
delay. : -
(i) That General Yahya Khan, General Abdul
Hamid Khan, Lt. Gen. S.G.M.M. Pirzada, Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan, Maj. Gen. Umar
and Maj. Gen. Mitha should be publicly tried for being party to a criminal
conspiracy to illegally usurp power from F.M. Mohammad Ayub Khan in power
if necessary by the use of force. In furtherance of their common purpose
they did actually try to influence political parties by threats,
inducements and even bribes to support their designs both for bringing
about a particular kind of result during the elections of 1970, and later
persuading some of the political parties and the elected members of the
National Assembly to refuse to attend the session of the National Assembly
scheduled to be held at Dacca on the 3rd of March, 1971. They,
furthermore, in agreement with each other brought about a situation in
East Pakistan which led to a civil disobedience movement, armed revolt by
the Awami League and subsequently tot he surrender of our troops in East
Pakistan and the dismemberment of Pakistan:
(ii) That the Officers mentioned in No. (i)
above should also be tried for criminal neglect of duty in the conduct of
war both in East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The details of this neglect
would be found in the Chapters dealing with the military aspect of the war
(iii) That Lt. Gen. Irshad Ahmad Khan, former Commander 1
Corps, be tried for criminal and wilful neglect of duty in conducting the
operations of his Corps in such a manner that nearly 500 villages of the
Shakargarh tehsil of Sialkot district in West Pakistan were surrendered to
the enemy without a fight and as a consequence the Army offensive in the
south was seriously jeopardised;
(iv) That Maj. Gen. Abid Zahid, former GOC 15 Div,
be tried for wilful neglect of duty and shameful surrender of a large area
comprising nearly 98 villages in the Phuklian salient in the Sialkot
district of West Pakistan, which surrender also posed a standing threat to
the safety of Marala Headworks by bringing the Indian forces within nearly
1500 yards thereof. He also kept the GHQ in the dark about Indian
occupation of the Phuklian salient until the loss was discovered after the
war.
(v) That Maj. Gen B.M. Mustafa, former GOC 18
Division, be tried for wilful neglect of duty in that his offensive plan
aimed at the capture of the Indian position of Ramgarh in the Rajasthan
area (Western Front) was militarily unsound and haphazardly planned, and
its execution resulted in severe loss of vehicles and equipment in the
desert.
(vi) That Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi, former Commander,
Eastern Command, be court-martialled on 15 charges as set out in Chapter
III of part V of the Supplementary Report regarding his wilful neglect in
the performance of his professional and military duties connected with the
defence of East Pakistan and the shameful surrender of his forces tot he
Indians at a juncture when he still had the capability and resources to
offer resistance.
(vii) That Maj. Gen. Mohammad Jamshed, former GOC
36 (ad-hoc) Division, Dacca, be tried by court martial on five charges
listed against him, in the aforementioned part of the Supplementary
Report, for wilful neglect of his duty in the preparation of plans for the
defence of Dacca and showing complete lack of courage and will to fight,
in acquiescing in the decision of the Commander, Eastern Command, to
surrender to the Indian forces when it was still possible to put up
resistance for a period of two weeks or so, and also for willfully
neglecting to inform the authorities concerned, on repatriation to
Pakistan, about the fact of distribution of Rs. 50,000 by him out of
Pakistan currency notes and other funds at his disposal or under his
control in East Pakistan.
(viii) That Maj. Gen. M. Rahim Khan, former GOC 39
(ad-hoc) Division, Chandpur, in East Pakistan, be tried by court martial
on five charges listed against him in this Report for showing undue regard
for his personal safety in abandoning his Division, his Divisional troops
and area of responsibility and vacating his Divisional Headquarters from
Chandpur on the 8th of December, 1971; for his wilful insistence on moving
by day owing to fear of Mukti Bahini and thus causing the death of
fourteen Naval ratings and four Officers of his own HQ, besides injuries
to himself and several others, due to strafing by Indian aircraft; for his
abandoning valuable signal equipment at Chandpur; for spreading
despondency and alarm by certain conversation on the 12th of December,
1971, at Dacca; and for willfully avoiding submitting a debriefing report
to GHQ on being specially evacuated to West Pakistan in early 1971 so as
to conceal the circumstances of his desertion from him Divisional
Headquarters at Chandpur.
(ix) That Brig. G.M. Baquir Siddiqui, former GOS,
Eastern Command, Dacca, be tried by court martial on nine charges as
formulated in this Report, for his wilful neglect of duty in advising the
Commander, Eastern Command, as regards the concept and formulation of
defence plans, appreciation of the Indian threat, execution of denial
plans, abrupt changes in command, friendliness with he Indian during
captivity and attempts to influence formation Commanders by threats and
inducements to present a coordinated story before the GHQ and the
Commission of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East
Pakistan.
(x) That Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Commander 107
Brigade, 9 Division, East Pakistan, be tried by court martial on four
charges for displaying wilful neglect in not formulating a sound plan for
the defence of the fortress of Jessore; for failing to properly plan and
command the brigade counter-attack at Gharibpur (Gauripur?), for
shamefully abandoning the fortress of Jessore and delivering intact to the
enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps; and disobeying the orders of the
GOC 9 Division, to withdraw to Magura in the event of a forced withdrawal
from Jessore;
(xi) That Brig Mohammad Aslam Niazi, former
commander 53 Brigade, 39 (ad-hoc) Division, East Pakistan, be tried by
court martial on six charges for displaying culpable lack of initiative,
determination and planning ability in that he failed to occupy and prepare
defences at Mudafarganj as ordered by his GOC on the 4th of December,
1971; for failing to eject the enemy from Mudafarganj as ordered on the
6th of December, 1971; for shamefully abandoning the fortress of Laksham
on or about the 9th of December, 1971; for wilful neglect in failing to
properly organise exfiltration of his troops from the fortress of Laksham
to Comilla on the 9th of December, 1971, thus resulting in heavy
casualties and capture of several elements of his troops on the way; for
showing callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksham 124
sick and wounded with two Medical Officers without informing them about
the proposed vacation of the fortress; and for abandoning intact at
Laksham all heavy weapons, stocks of ammunition and supplies for the use
of the enemy
II. Inquiry and Trials for Alleged Atrocities
4. That as recommended in Paragraph 7 of
Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report and in Paragraph 39 of Chapter II
of Part V of this Supplementary Report, a high-powered Court or Commission
of Inquiry be set up to investigate into persistent allegations of
atrocities said to have been committed by the Pakistan Army in East
Pakistan during its operations from March to December, 1971, and to hold
trials of those who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad name to
the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies of the local population by
their acts of wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The
composition of the Court of Inquiry, if not its proceedings, should be
publicly announced so as to satisfy national conscience and international
opinion. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available
in Pakistan for a fruitful inquiry to be undertaken in this regard. As
the Government of Bangladesh has since been recognised by Pakistan, it may
also be feasible to request the Dacca authorities to forward to this Court
of Inquiry whatever evidence may be available with them.
III. Other Inquiries
5 . (i) That allegations of personal immorality,
drunkenness and indulgence in corrupt practices against General Yahya
Khan, General Abdul Hamid Khan and Maj. Gen Khuda Dad Khan be properly
investigated as there is prima facie evidence to show that their moral
degeneration resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional
incompetence. In the light of the result of this inquiry suitable charges
may be added against these Officers, during the trials we have already
recommended earlier. The details of the allegations and the evidence
relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report.
(ii) That similar allegations of personal
immorality, acquiring a notorious reputation in this behalf at Sialkot,
Lahore and Dacca, and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan from East to West
Pakistan made against Lt. Gen. Niazi should also be inquired into and, if
necessary, made the subject matter of additional charges at the trial
earlier recommended in respect of the performance of his professional
duties in East Pakistan. The details of these allegations and the
evidence relating thereto will be found in Chapter I of Part V of the Main
Report and in Chapter I of part V of this supplementary Report.
(iii) That an inquiry is also indicated into the
disposal of Rs.50, 000 said to have been distributed by Maj. Gen. Mohammad
Jamshed, former GOC 39 (ad-hoc) Division and Director General, East
Pakistan Civil Armed Forces immediately before the surrender on the 16th
of December 1971. Details of this matter including the General's
explanation would be found in paragraphs 21 to 23 of Chapter I of Part V
of the Supplementary Report. We have already recommended that this
Officer be tried by a court martial on several charges including his
wilful failure to disclose any facts at all about his sum Rs.50,000. That
charge does not necessarily imply any dishonest practice on his part. The
inquiry now suggested can form a part of the charges already recommended.
(iv) That allegations of indulging in large-scale
looting of property in East Pakistan including theft of Rs.1, 35,00,000
from the National Bank Treasury at Siraj Ganj persistently made against
Brig. Jehanazeb Arbab, former Commander 57 Brigade, Lt Col (now Brig)
Muzaffar Ali Zahid, former CO 31 Field Regiment, Lt. Col. Basharat Ahmad,
former CO 18 Punjab, Lt. Col Mohammad Taj, former CO 32 Punjab, Lt Col
Mohammad Tufail, former CO 55 Field Regiment and Major Madad Hussain Shah
of 18 Punjab, as set out in paragraph 24 and 25 of Chapter I of part V of
the Supplementary Report, should be thoroughly inquired into and suitable
action taken in the light of the proved facts.
(v) That an inquiry be held into the allegation,
noticed by us in paragraph 36 of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Main Report,
that while serving in the Martial Law Administration at Multan, Maj. Gen.
Jahanzeb, presumably a Brigadier at that time, demanded a bribe of Rs. One
lac from a PCS Officer posted as Chairman of the Municipal Committee of
Multan, on pain of proceeding against him for corruption under martial
Law, as a consequence of which demand the said PCS Officer is said to have
committed suicide leaving behind a letter saying that although he had made
only Rs.15,000 he was being required to pay Rs. one lac to the Martial Law
officers. The allegation was made before the Commission by Brig. Mohammad
Abbas Beg (Witness No.9)
(vi) That in inquiry is also necessary into the
allegation made against Brig. Hayatullah that he entertained some women in
his bunker in the Maqbulpur sector (West Pakistan) on the night of the
11th or 12th of December, 1971, when Indian shells were falling on his
troops. The allegation was contained in an anonymous letter addressed to
the Commission and supported in evidence before us by the Brigadier
Hayatullah's brigade, Major, namely, Major Munawar Khan (Witness No.42).
(vii) That it is necessary to investigate into the
allegations, as set out in Paragraphs 9 to 14 of Chapter 1 of Part V of
the Main Report, to the effect that senior Army Commanders grossly abused
their official position and powers under the Martial Law to acquire large
allotments of land, and obtained substantial house buildings loans on
extremely generous terms from certain banking institutions with which they
deposited large amounts from departmental funds entrusted to their care.
Those found guilty of corrupt practices should receive the punishment they
deserve under the military law or the ordinary criminal law of the land as
the case may be.
(viii) That a thorough investigation be conducted
into the suspicion created in the mind of the Commission, during the
recording of additional evidence of Officers repatriated form India, that
there may be some complicity or collusion between the Commander, Easter
Command (Lt. Gen. A.A.K. Niazi) and his Chief of Staff (Brig G.M. Baqir
Saddiqui) on the one hand and the Indian authorities on the other in the
matter of the failure of the Pakistan Armed Forces to carry out execution
of denial plans immediately before the surrender in spite of instructions
issued in this behalf by GHQ on the 10th of December, 1971. We have
already included relevant charges in this behalf against these two
Officers, but we consider that it would be in the public interest to
depute a specialized agency to probe into the matter further. On the
material available to us we cannot put the matter higher than suspicion,
but we have not been able to find any reasonable, or even plausible
explanation for the orders issued by the Easter Command to stop the
execution of denial plans, particularly in Dacca and Chittagong, thus
ensuring the delivery intact to the Indians of large amounts of war
materials and other equipment. Details of these deliveries will be found
in our Chapter VII of Part IV dealing with the aftermath of surrender.
(ix) That an inquiry be held into the circumstances
under which Commander Gul Zareen of the Pakistan Navy was carried from
Khulna to Singapore on the 7th of December, 1971, by a French ship called
M.V. Fortescue, thus abandoning his duties at PNS Titumir Naval Base,
Khulna. The case of this Officer was dealt with by us in Paragraphs 12 and
13 of Chapter III of Part V of the Main Report.
IV. Cases Requiring Departmental Action
6. While examining the course of events and
the conduct of war in East Pakistan, we formed a poor opinion about the
performance and capabilities of Brig. S.A .Ansari, ex-Commander 23
Brigade, Brig. Manzoor Ahmad, ex-Commander 57 Brigade, 9 Division, and
Brig. Abdul Qadir Khan, ex-Commander 94 brigade, 36 (ad hoc) Division. We
consider that their further retention in service is not in the public
interest and they may accordingly be retired.
V. Performance and Conduct of Junior Officers
7. In the very nature of things the
Commission was not in a position to examine at any length the conduct and
performance of officers below the brigade level, although some case
necessarily came to our notice where the performance of these Officers had
a direct bearing on the fate of important battles or where their conduct
transgressed the norms of discipline. Such cases have been mentioned by
us at their proper place, but by and large cases of junior officers must
be dealt with by the respective service headquarters who have obtained
detailed debriefing reports from all of them and are also in possession of
the assessment of their performance by their immediate superiors.
VI. Measures for Moral Reform in the Armed
Forces
8. While dealing at some length with the moral aspect of
the 1971 debacle, in Chapter I of Part V of the Main Report as well as in
the corresponding Chapter of the present Supplementary Report, we have
expressed the opinion that there is indeed substance in the widespread
allegation, rather belief, that due to corruption arising out of the
performance of Martial Law duties, lust for wine and women, and greed for
lands and houses a large number of senior Army Officers, particularly
those occupying the highest positions, had not only lost the will to fight
but also the professional competence necessary for taking the vital and
critical decisions demanded ofthem for the successful prosecution of the
war. Accordingly, we recommend that: -
(i) The Government should call upon all Officers of
the Armed Forces to submit declarations of their assets, both moveable and
immovable, and those acquired in the names of their relations and
dependents during the last ten years (they were exempted from submitting
such declarations during the last two periods of martial Law). If on
examination of such declarations any Officer is found to have acquired
assets beyond this known means, then appropriate action should be taken
against him
(ii) The Armed Services should devise ways and
means to ensure: -
(a) That moral values are not allowed to be
compromised by infamous behaviour particularly at higher levels;
(b) That moral rectitude is given due weight along
with professional qualities in the matter of promotion to higher ranks;
(c) That syllabi of academic studies at the
military academics and other Service Institutions should include courses
designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious democratic
and political institutions;
(d) That use of alcoholic drinks should be banned
in military messes and functions
(e) That serious notice should be taken of
notorious sexual behaviour and other corrupt practices
VII. Discipline and Terms and Conditions of
Service
9. These matters were discussed by us in Chapter III of
Part V of the Main Report, and for the reasons given therein we make the
following recommendations: -
(i) An inter-services study should be undertaken of
the operative terms and conditions of service and amenities available to
Officers, JCOs and other ranks of the Services so as to remove disparities
existing in this behalf and causing discontentment among the junior
officers and other ranks of various Services
(ii) The GHQ should consider the advisability of
adopting recommendations contained in the report submitted by the
Discipline Committee headed by the late Maj. Gen. Iftikhar Khan Janjua
(iii) The Navy and Air Force might also appoint
their own Discipline Committees to consider the peculiar problems of their
Services, such measure to be in addition to the inter-services study
recommended above.
VIII. Improvement and Modernization of the
Pakistan Navy
10. From the detailed discussion of the role of the Navy,
as contained in Section (D) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main Report,
and supplemented by further details of its operations in East Pakistan is
set out in this Supplementary Report, it seems to us that the following
steps are urgently called for to improve our naval capability: -
(i) That immediate attention should be given to he
basic requirements for the modernization of the Pakistan Navy in order to
make it capable of protecting the only sea port of Pakistan and of keeping
the lifelines of the nation open. The Navy has been sadly neglected ever
since the first Martial Law regime, for in the concept of Army Commander
the Navy was not expected to play much of a role. The folly of this
theory was fully demonstrated during this war. The Pakistan Navy, we
strongly recommend, should have its own air arm of suitable aircraft for
the purpose of reconnaissance and for defence against missile boats. This
is the only way in which the threat posed by the growing Indian Navy and
her missile boats can be countered.
(ii) There is urgent need for developing a separate
harbour for the Navy away from Karachi, from where the Navy can protect
the approaches to Karachi more effectively
(iii) In view of the serious handicaps which were
posed by the late conveyance of the D-day and the H-hour to the Pakistan
Navy and its total exclusion from he planning for war, the need for making
the Navy a fully operative member in he joint Chiefs of Staff Organization
is imperative.
IX. Improvement in the Role of P.A.F.
11. In Section (C) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main
Report as well as in a separate Chapter of the present supplement (viz
Chapter X of Part III), we have discussed at length the role and
performance of the P.A.F. in the 1971 war. In the light of that
discussion, we recommend as follows: -
(i) We are not convinced that a more
forward-looking posture cannot be adopted by eh Air Force having regard to
the peculiar needs of the country. We recommend, therefore, that Pakistan
should have more forward air fields located at such places from where it
might be in a position to give more protection to our vital line of
communication as well as to major centres of industry. The adoption of
such a forward strategy would also increase the striking capabilities of
our fighters.
(ii) There is need also to improve the working of
our early warning system. The time lag between the observation of an
enemy aircraft by the first line of Mobile Observer Units and the final
collation of that information in the Air Operation Centre takes unduly
long because of the draftory system of reporting adopted. Training
exercises to coordinate the working of the various agencies employed for
the operation of the early warning system should be held periodically to
keep them at a high pitch of efficiency.
(iii) The Karachi Port should also be provided as
soon as possible, with a low level seaward-looking radar which it
seriously lacks and due to the want of which it suffered many handicaps
during the last war.
(iv) That with the increased Indian capability of
blockading Karachi with missile boats the air defence of Karachi should be
attached greater importance. Leaving the defence of Karachi to be tackled
only by one squadron of fighters and a half squadron of bombers was
extremely unwise.
X. Re-organization of Air Defence of Pakistan
12. The subject of air defence has been discussed by us at
some length in section (13) of Chapter VIII of Part IV of the Main
Report. In the light of that discussion, we make the following
recommendations: -
(a) Since it will not be possible for us to enlarge
our Air Force to any appreciable extent in the near future, we strongly
recommend that we should strengthen our air defence programmes by at least
doubling our holdings of anti-craft guns by the end of 1972 and ultimately
raising it under a phased programme to 342 Batteries as suggested by the
Air Force.
(b) Efforts should also be made to procure ground
to air missiles for a more effective air defence of the country.
(c) If ground-to-air missiles are not available,
then efforts should also be made to get radar controlled medium HAA guns
from China.
XI. Recommendations with Regard to Civil
Defence Measures
13. This subject has also examined by us in Chapter VIII
of Part IV of the Main Report, and we consider that the following measures
are called for to improve the civil defence aspects in Pakistan: -
(a) The civil defence arrangements should be placed
under the Ministry of Defence, and not be made the responsibility of the
Ministry of Interior or other individual departments. The Central
Government should accept the responsibility for the overall control and
organization of the civil defence of the country, as Provincial
Governments have not been able to shoulder this responsibility effectively
in the past.
(b) Steps should be taken to improve the
fire-fighting facilities in the country, particularly in ports and
industrial areas.
(c) Industrialists keeping inflammable materials
near lines of communications and other vulnerable points should be induce,
or in fact obliged under the law, to accept responsibility for the
protection of their materials, and make effective arrangements for
fire-fighting in their establishments.
(d) Provision should be made for storing large
quantitative of petrol and other fuels underground.
XII. Higher Direction of War
14. The deficiencies in the organization for
the higher direction of war were examined by us in Chapter XI of Part IV
of the Main Report, and in the light of that discussion, we proposed the
following measures: -
(a) The three Service Headquarters should be located at
one place along with the Ministry of Defence.
(b) The posts of Commander-in-Chiefs should be
replaced by Chiefs of Staff of the respective services (This, we
understand, has already been done by the Government)
(c) The Defence Committee of the Cabinet should be
re-activated and it should be ensured that its meetings are held
regularly. A positive direction should be added in its Charter to give
the Cabinet Division the right to initiate proceedings for the convening
of its meetings should be held even in the absence of the President or the
Prime Minister under the Chairmanship of the senior most minister present.
(d) There should also be a Defence Ministers
Committee and the Ministry of Defence should assume its rightful position
as a policy-making body and incorporating policy, decisions into defence
programmes after consultations with the three services. This should
ensure the preparations of realistic plans for the national defence with
in the agreed framework of (illegible) allocations. It should meet under
the chairmanship of the Defence Minister and comprise the Defence
Secretary, the three service chiefs, the financial adviser for defence,
the Director General of Civil Defence, the Director General of munitions
production, the Director General of Defence Procurement, the Director
General of inter-services Intelligence Directorate, the Defence Scientific
Adviser and any other Central Secretary or Service officer who may be
required for a particular item on agenda. If the defence portfolio is
held by the President or the Prime Minister then its meeting may be
presided over by a Deputy Minister for or by the Minister in charge of
Defence Production (illegible) Minister is available, the Defence
Secretary should preside, irrespective of any considerations of protocol
or (illegible)
(e) The Secretaries Coordination Committee as at present
constituted, should continue
(f) (illegible) The three services should share
(illegible) joint responsibility for national defence and that all plans
and programmes for the development of the (illegible) forces should be
based on joint (illegible) objectives, it is necessary. Therefore, that
the three services Chief should (illegible) As Joint Chiefs of Staff and
not merely as individual Heads of their respective Services. This Joint
Chiefs or Staff should constitute a corporate body with collective
responsibility having its own (illegible) staff for evolving joint plans
and its own Headquarters located on one place. The (illegible) of
chairman of this Joint Chiefs of Staff must be held by rotation,
irrespective of the personal ranks enjoyed by the three service chiefs.
The duration of the tenure should be one year at a time and the
chairmanship should commence with the (illegible) Service, mainly, the
Army. A detailed Chapter of duties for this Joint Chiefs of Staff has
been suggested in Annexure 'I' of Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main
report.
(g) Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organisation
there will not only by a Secretariat but also a joint planning staff drawn
from all the three Services. It might be designed as the Joint
Secretariat and Planning Staff. It will be responsible not only for
providing the necessary secretarial assistance (illegible) Also for
evolving the joint defence plans and (illegible) studies of processing of
all matters inter-(illegible) The Joint Chief of Staff may also have
other Joint Common to assist them on such matters, as it may consider
necessary.
(h) The weakness, in the (illegible) of the armed
forces, which have been brought by light, (illegible) feel that there is
need for an institution like the America (illegible) General which should
be a body changed was the duty of carrying out surprise inspection and
calling area the formations and (illegible) concerned to demonstrate that
the (illegible) (this paragraph not readable)
(i) We have also felt the (illegible) for in
Institute of Strategic Studies, preferably as a part of a University
Programme. The need for such an (illegible) has been highlighted by the
weakness in our joint strategic panning by the three Services. We are of
the opinion that such an Institute will go a long way in producing studies
of value for examination by the other defence organizations.
XIII National Security Council
15. Having examined the working of the
National Security Council in Chapter XI of Part IV of the Main Report we
are of the opinion that there is no need for super-(illegible) such an
organization on the Directorate of Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate
of Inter-Services Intelligence. The Security Council should therefore be
abolished.
XIV. The Farman Ali incident
16. In view of the fresh evidence examined by
us regarding the role of Maj. Gen. Farman Ali, which we have discussed in
the concluding portion of Chapter III of Part V of the Supplementary
Report, recommendation No. 7 made in the Main Report has now become
(illegible); as we have found that in delivering a message to Mr. Paul
Mare Henry, Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations. Maj. Gen.
Farman Ali, acted under the instructions of the Governor of East Pakistan,
who in turn had been authorised by the then President of Pakistan to make
certain proposals for settlement in East Pakistan at the critical
juncture.
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